"Tet Offensive". History. สืบค้นเมื่อ December 22, 2014.
Hoang, p. 8.
The South Vietnamese regime estimated communist forces at 323,000, including 130,000 regulars and 160,000 guerrillas. Hoang, p. 10. MACV estimated that strength at 330,000. The CIA and the U.S. State Department concluded that the communist force level lay somewhere between 435,000 and 595,000. Dougan and Weiss, p. 184.
Tổng công kích, Tổng nổi dậy Tết mậu thân 1968 (Tet Offensive 1968) – ARVN's Đại Nam publishing in 1969, p. 35
Does not include ARVN or U.S. casualties incurred during the "Border Battles"; ARVN killed, wounded, or missing from Phase III; U.S. wounded from Phase III; or U.S. missing during Phases II and III.
Steel and Blood: South Vietnamese Armor and the War for Southeast Asia. Naval Institute Press, 2008. P 33
Includes casualties incurred during the "Border Battles", Tet Mau Than, and the second and third phases of the offensive. General Tran Van Tra claimed that from January through August 1968 the offensive had cost the communists more than 75.000 dead and wounded. This is probably a low estimate. Tran Van Tra, Tet, in Jayne S. Warner and Luu Doan Huynh, eds., The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives. Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993, pgs. 49 & 50.
PAVN's Department of warfare, 124th/TGi, document 1.103 (11-2-1969)
Ang, p. 351. Two interpretations of the offensive's goals have continued to dominate Western historical debate. The first maintained that the political consequences of the winter-spring offensive were an intended rather than an unintended consequence. This view was supported by William Westmoreland and his friend Jamie Salt in A Soldier Reports, Garden City NY: Doubleday, 1976, p. 322; Harry G. Summers in On Strategy, Novato CA: Presidio Press, 1982, p. 133; Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts, The Irony of Vietnam, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1979, pp. 333–334; and Schmitz p. 90. This thesis appeared logical in hindsight, but it "fails to account for any realistic North Vietnamese military objectives, the logical prerequisite for an effort to influence American opinion." James J. Wirtz in The Tet Offensive, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1991, p. 18. The second thesis (which was also supported by the majority of contemporary captured VC documents) was that the goal of the offensive was the immediate toppling of the Saigon government or, at the very least, the destruction of the government apparatus, the installation of a coalition government, or the occupation of large tracts of South Vietnamese territory. Historians supporting this view are Stanley Karnow in Vietnam, New York: Viking, 1983, p. 537; U.S. Grant Sharp in Strategy for Defeat, San Rafael CA: Presidio Press, 1978, p. 214; Patrick McGarvey in Visions of Victory, Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1969; and Wirtz, p. 60.
"U.S. Involvement in the Vietnam War: The Tet Offensive, 1968". United States Department of State. สืบค้นเมื่อ December 29, 2014.
การร, กตร, ษญวน, งกฤษ, offensive, เว, ยดนาม, sự, kiện, tết, mậu, thân, 1968, หร, tổng, tiến, công, nổi, dậy, tết, mậu, thân, เป, นการท, พทางทหารคร, งใหญ, ดคร, งหน, งในสงครามเว, ยดนาม, เป, ดฉากเม, อว, นท, มกราคม, 2511, โดยกำล, งเว, ยดกงและกองท, พประชาชนเว, ยดนา. karruktrusywn xngkvs Tet Offensive ewiydnam Sự kiện Tết Mậu Than 1968 hrux Tổng tiến cong va nổi dậy Tết Mậu Than epnkarthphthangthharkhrngihythisudkhrnghnunginsngkhramewiydnam epidchakemuxwnthi 30 mkrakhm 2511 odykalngewiydkngaelakxngthphprachachnewiydnamehnuxtxkalngewiydnamit shrthaelaphnthmitr epnkarthphkarocmtixyangcuocmtxkxngbychakarthharaelaphleruxnaelasunykhwbkhumthwpraethsewiydnamit 10 karrukniidchuxcakwnhyudtrusywn ett Tết 11 emuxekidkarocmtiihykhrngaerkkarruktrusywnSự kiện Tết Mậu Thanepnswnhnungkhxng sngkhramewiydnamepahmaybangswnkhxngkhxmmiwnistrahwangkarruktrusywnwnthi rayathi 1 30 mkrakhm 28 minakhm 2511rayathi 2 5 phvsphakhm 15 mithunayn 2511rayathi 3 17 singhakhm 23 knyayn 2511sthanthi praethsewiydnamitphllphth shrthaelaewiydnamitchnathangyuththwithi 1 ewiydnamehnuxchnathangkarokhsnachwnechux karemuxngaelayuththsastr 2 khukhdaeyngkalngtxtankhxmmiwnist ewiydnamit shrth ekahliit xxsetreliy niwsiaelnd ithy ewiydkng ewiydnamehnuxphubychakarhruxphunakaw wn ewiyn wileliym ewstmxraelnd hhwang wn thay hwx engwiyn sapkalng 1 000 000 3 rayathi 1 80 000rwm 323 000 595 000 4 kalngphlsuyesiyinrayathi 1 ewiydnamit esiychiwit 4 954 naybadecb 15 917 naysuyhay 926 nay xun esiychiwit 4 124 naybadecb 19 295 naysuyhay 604 naykalngphlsuyesiythnghmdinrayathi 1 parman 45 820 nay esiychiwit 9 078 badecb 35 212 suyhay 1 530 5 6 xakasyanthukthalay 123 ekhruxng esiyhayhnk 214 ekhruxngaelaesiyhaypanklang 215 ekhruxng 7 rwmrayathi 3 imthrab inrayathi 1 esiychiwitpraman 17 000 nayaelabadecb 20 000 nay thungeduxnsinghakhm kalngphlsuyesiy 75 000 nay 8 rwmrayathi 3 kalngphlsuyesiy 111 179 nay esiychiwit 45 267 badecb 61 267 suyhay 5 070 9 phleruxn esiychiwit 14 000 khn badecb 24 000 khnfaykhxmmiwnistdaeninkarocmtiepnralxkinklangdukkhxngwnthi 30 mkrakhminekhtyuththwithiehlathi 1 aelathi 2 khxngewiydnamit karocmtichwngaerkniimnaipsumatrkarpxngknxyangkwangkhwang emuxptibtikarhlkkhxngkhxmmiwnisteriminechawnrungkhun karrukklamipthwpraethsaelamikarprasannganxyangdi cnsudthaymikalngkhxmmiwnistkwa 80 000 nayocmtiemuxngaelankhrkwa 100 aehng sungrwmemuxnghlkkhxng 36 cak 44 cnghwd nkhrpkkhrxngtnexng 5 cak 6 aehng emuxngekht 72 cak 245 aehng aelakrungisngxn emuxnghlwngkhxngewiydnamit 12 karrukniepnptibtikarthangthharihythisudkhxngthngsxngfaycnthungewlannkarocmtikhntnthaihkxngthphshrthaelaewiydnamitsbsnaelathaihesiykarkhwbkhumhlaynkhrepnkarchwkhraw aetksamarthcdklumihmephuxkhbkarocmtiklbip thaihkalngkhxmmiwnistmikalngphlsuyesiymhasal rahwangyuththkarthiew karsurbxyngadueduxdkinewlahnungeduxn thaihkalngshrththalaynkhr rahwangkaryudkhrxng khxmmiwnistpraharchiwitprachachnhlayphnkhninehtukarnkarsngharhmuthiew karsurbdaeniniprxb thanthphshrththiekhsanepnewlaxiksxngeduxn aemkarrukcaepnkhwamphayaephthangthharsahrbfaykhxmmiwnist aetmiphllphthihyhlwngtxrthbalshrthaelathaihsatharnchnshrthtalung sungthukphunathangkaremuxngaelathharechuxwafaykhxmmiwnistkalngprachyaelaimsamarthdaeninkhwamphyayammohlarechnniid karsnbsnunsngkhramkhxngsatharnchnshrthesuxmlngaelashrthaeswngkarecrcaephuxyutisngkhramkhawa karruktrusywn pktihmaythungkarrukineduxnmkrakhm kumphaphnth 2511 aetxacrwmkarrukthieriyk trusywnelk sungekidineduxnphvsphakhmthungsinghakhmdwy 13 xangxing aekikh Smedberg p 188 Tet Offensive History subkhnemux December 22 2014 Hoang p 8 The South Vietnamese regime estimated communist forces at 323 000 including 130 000 regulars and 160 000 guerrillas Hoang p 10 MACV estimated that strength at 330 000 The CIA and the U S State Department concluded that the communist force level lay somewhere between 435 000 and 595 000 Dougan and Weiss p 184 Tổng cong kich Tổng nổi dậy Tết mậu than 1968 Tet Offensive 1968 ARVN s Đại Nam publishing in 1969 p 35 Does not include ARVN or U S casualties incurred during the Border Battles ARVN killed wounded or missing from Phase III U S wounded from Phase III or U S missing during Phases II and III Steel and Blood South Vietnamese Armor and the War for Southeast Asia Naval Institute Press 2008 P 33 Includes casualties incurred during the Border Battles Tet Mau Than and the second and third phases of the offensive General Tran Van Tra claimed that from January through August 1968 the offensive had cost the communists more than 75 000 dead and wounded This is probably a low estimate Tran Van Tra Tet in Jayne S Warner and Luu Doan Huynh eds The Vietnam War Vietnamese and American Perspectives Armonk NY M E Sharpe 1993 pgs 49 amp 50 PAVN s Department of warfare 124th TGi document 1 103 11 2 1969 Ang p 351 Two interpretations of the offensive s goals have continued to dominate Western historical debate The first maintained that the political consequences of the winter spring offensive were an intended rather than an unintended consequence This view was supported by William Westmoreland and his friend Jamie Salt in A Soldier Reports Garden City NY Doubleday 1976 p 322 Harry G Summers in On Strategy Novato CA Presidio Press 1982 p 133 Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts The Irony of Vietnam Washington D C The Brookings Institution 1979 pp 333 334 and Schmitz p 90 This thesis appeared logical in hindsight but it fails to account for any realistic North Vietnamese military objectives the logical prerequisite for an effort to influence American opinion James J Wirtz in The Tet Offensive Ithaca NY Cornell University Press 1991 p 18 The second thesis which was also supported by the majority of contemporary captured VC documents was that the goal of the offensive was the immediate toppling of the Saigon government or at the very least the destruction of the government apparatus the installation of a coalition government or the occupation of large tracts of South Vietnamese territory Historians supporting this view are Stanley Karnow in Vietnam New York Viking 1983 p 537 U S Grant Sharp in Strategy for Defeat San Rafael CA Presidio Press 1978 p 214 Patrick McGarvey in Visions of Victory Stanford CA Stanford University Press 1969 and Wirtz p 60 U S Involvement in the Vietnam War The Tet Offensive 1968 United States Department of State subkhnemux December 29 2014 Dougan and Weiss p 8 1 ekhathungcak https th wikipedia org w index php title karruktrusywn amp oldid 9568968, wikipedia, วิกิ หนังสือ, หนังสือ, ห้องสมุด,